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Abstract We argue in favor of the shareholder model of the firm because assigning
the full surplus of the firm to shareholders provides the best possible social insurance
by diversifying firm-specific risks on capital markets. Coordination in wage bargain-
ing and collective norms on what is proper compensation play an important role in
reducing the claim of workers on the firm’s surplus. In Denmark, workers bear less
firm-specific risk than workers in the United States do. Collective action thus has
an important role to play. Politicians, however, face the temptation to please voters
and incumbent workers with short-run gains at the expense of exposing workers to
firm-specific risks and reducing future job creation.
Keywords Wage setting · Optimal risk sharing · Employment protection ·
Corporate governance
JEL Classification D20 · J50 · L20 · P10
1 Introduction
Harry Truman is purported to have asked for a single-handed economist. Whenever he
asked for an economist’s advice, the answer invariably would be: on the one hand . . . ,
A.L. Bovenberg ()
Tilburg University, CentER and Netspar, Tilburg, The Netherlands
e-mail: A.L.Bovenberg@uvt.nl
C. Teulings
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague, The Netherlands
e-mail: teulings@cpb.nl
C. Teulings
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Rhineland exit? 711
but on the other hand . . . . This is indeed how economists often reason. They think in
terms of trade-offs: for example, equity versus efficiency, insurance versus incentives,
and rules versus discretion. The optimal policy response is almost always a combina-
tion of various sides of the trade-offs. Extremes usually do not work that well. One
should thus expect a similar response on issues of corporate governance. Should cor-
porate governance legislation (and in line with that legislation: public norms on cor-
porate behavior) oblige the management of a company to weigh the interests of all of
its stakeholders (that is, its workers, customers, suppliers and shareholders) equally,
as is supposed to be the case in the so-called Rhineland model? Or should the law
impose on management the sole duty to pursue the long-term interest of the share-
holders, as being the ultimate owners of the company, as is supposed to be the case
in the so-called Anglo-Saxon model? In the tradition of Harry Truman, one would
expect economists to favor the Rhineland solution, which gives all stakeholders their
fair share (e.g. by giving workers the right to nominate some board members, as in
Germany).
This paper discusses an exception to the general rule that compromises are op-
timal. Indeed, we argue that firms should maximize long-run shareholder value be-
cause this provides the best possible insurance to workers. Making shareholders the
ultimate residual claimant allows diversification of firm-specific risks. By reducing
the exposure of workers to the risks associated with international competition, this
outcome makes globalization of markets and the associated creative destruction more
legitimate, so that productivity growth can increase. The shareholder model does not
imply that the firm should not care for its workers. On the contrary, maximization
of long-run shareholder value should lead the firm to listen to its workers, and seek
to please them and learn from them. In this way, workers stay loyal to the firm and
hence contribute to the firm’s profits to the best of their ability while reducing costly
job turnover.
Whereas we argue in favor of the shareholder model, we maintain that the tradi-
tional focus on corporate governance legislation is mistaken. A change in this leg-
islation will likely be of little help to reach the optimum. In fact, countries such as
the United States and the United Kingdom that have this type of legislation are fur-
ther away from this optimum than some other countries are. In order to explain this,
we take a labor economist’s perspective and show that proper norms regarding the
way excess profits should be shared between the firm and its workers are more im-
portant than corporate governance legislation in arriving at an efficient organization
of society. In particular, labor-market institutions such as central wage bargaining in
Scandinavian countries appear to be key in restraining the claims of workers on the
surplus of the firm.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. By distinguishing various risks,
Sect. 2 allows us to lay out a Utopian world: Who should bear what type of risk,
and for what reason? Section 3 discusses the reasons why such a world is difficult
to realize. Section 4 explores the question which of three prototypical economies
is closest to Utopia. Section 5 explores why politicians have an inherent tendency
to move away from Utopia. Section 6 sketches the implications of our analysis for
corporate governance legislation. Section 7 concludes.
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2 The grand design of Utopia
New ideas are tested all the time by investing effort and other resources. Most ideas
fail; only some succeed. This permanent state of experimentation drives productivity
growth. The question is: Who should bear the risk on these investments? A large
part of these investments takes the form of workers getting a job at a particular firm
and acquiring knowledge and skills that, to a greater or lesser extent, are specific to
the mission of the firm. The risk on these investments can be decomposed into three
types: (i) individual-specific risk; (ii) firm-specific risk; and (iii) aggregate risk.1 For
each of these risk types, different rules determine who is the best party to bear this
risk in a Utopian world of optimal risk sharing.
2.1 Individual-specific risks
Individual-specific risk relates to the ability of the individual to acquire skills and the
market value of these skills. Both are unknown at the moment when the worker starts
learning them. Since the worker is risk averse, she would like to put the risk of these
investments on others—for example, social insurance, a private insurance company or
the owners of the worker’s firm. This gives rise, however, to a moral-hazard problem.
Acquiring skills requires effort on the part of the worker, and this effort is not easily
observable by the insurer. If the worker obtains no monetary reward for her skills, she
has little incentive to spend this effort. We thus face a trade-off: If the insurer takes all
of the risk, then the worker is perfectly insured, but has no incentive to provide effort;
if the worker takes all of the risk, she has optimal incentives to provide effort, but she
is not insured at all. Here, the optimum is indeed a fair compromise: The individual-
specific risk should be shared between the worker and the insurer—whoever that
may be. This is a so-called principal-agent problem: If information about the effort
of the risk-averse agent is imperfect in the presence of individual-specific risks, then
getting the incentives right in the relationship between a principal (the insurer) and
a risk-averse agent (the worker) yields some loss of efficiency (see Holmstrom and
Milgrom 1987).
How could a firm insure workers against their individual-specific risks? An an-
swer to this question requires that we look somewhat deeper into the nature of
individual-specific risk. Though most people consider unemployment as the main
source of individual-specific risk, other factors are more important. Unemploy-
ment spells usually last only a couple of months, which is only a small time span
from a lifetime perspective. Changes in individual wages have a much larger and
more persistent effect on lifetime incomes (Low et al. 2006). In fact, an upward
or downward shock in a worker’s productivity2 today is likely to affect almost
1Teulings (2008) distinguishes a fourth type of risk: match-specific risk. This is individual-specific risk that
applies only as long as the relationship with the firm survives. One could thus say that these individual-
specific risks are firm specific. Just as other firm-specific risks, these risks are ideally borne by the share-
holders of the firm who can diversify this risk on capital markets. See the discussion below on firm-specific
risks.
2Empirically, we observe only the individual’s wage, not her productivity, but it is likely that both series
are similar in this regard.
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one-for-one her productivity until the date of retirement (Abowd and Card 1989;
Topel and Ward 1992). Individual wages thus follow (almost) a geometric random
walk.
This shape of an individual’s productivity profile has strong implications for the
type of insurance that a firm can provide. Since a negative shock today affects a
worker’s earning capacity from today until the date of her retirement, some form of
insurance by the firm implies that the firm must cover part of that lifetime cost. One
likely form this insurance takes is that productivity shocks are not fully transmitted
into the wage so that individuals with positive shocks are underpaid compared to their
productivity, while individuals with negative shocks are overpaid.
Since workers are free to switch between firms, this raises a serious problem.
Workers who experienced positive productivity shocks will find it easy to find a new
job at an equal or higher wage, since their productivity levels are way above their
current wages. However, for workers with negative shocks, the reverse holds. Hence,
firms face an adverse-selection problem: Good workers quit, bad workers stay. Work-
ers, on their part, face a moral hazard problem: By firing the bad workers, the firm
saves the wage subsidy to this group of workers. Firms can thus not contribute to
insurance of individual-specific risks. Public social insurance is the only option for
insurance, either via social security, or through a progressive tax system. An elabo-
rate discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on the
role of firms as insurers of various risks.
2.2 Firm-specific risks
The second type of risk, firm-specific risk, is related to the evolution of the market
for the firm’s products, the market value of its R&D, etc. In a modern knowledge
economy, the increased importance of innovation, creative destruction and interna-
tional competition has raised firm-specific risks. Just like individual-specific risk,
firm-specific risk is characterized by a geometric random walk (see Jovanovich 1982).
Firm-specific risk can be well diversified on the capital market. By holding the
equity of a large number of different firms whose risks are uncorrelated, shareholders
can ensure that the bad luck of one firm cancels against the good luck of another.
In this way, firm-specific risk almost “disappears”. Traditionally, the scope for di-
versification has been limited by the strong home bias in the portfolios of investors.
Investors tend to hold too large a share of their investments in their home country,
thereby foregoing part of the gains from diversification (see Feldstein and Horioka
1980 and Gordon and Bovenberg 1996). However, the most recent wave of global-
ization of capital markets has undone most of the home bias in portfolios, thereby
improving the scope for risk diversification (see Rajan 2005). Even if capital mar-
kets are incomplete, it is more efficient to allocate firm-specific risks to capital rather
than labor because capital markets provide better scope for diversification than labor
markets.
Since the firm-specific risk can be diversified in the capital market, it does not
make sense to assign part of it to risk-averse workers. Providing individual workers
with a claim on the firm’s profits does not improve individual incentives much. An
individual’s reward should instead be tied to indicators that better measure individual
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performance (e.g. by comparing individual performance with that of other workers).
Hence, the wages of individual workers should not vary too much with the firm’s
well being, except in small firms where the effort of each individual worker has a
considerable impact on the performance of the firm as a whole.
2.3 Firm-specific human capital
If the firm bears all of the firm-specific risk, does not this imply that investments in
firm-specific human capital would be too low? This depends on whether the Hosios
(1990) condition is met: The cost of specific investment should be shared between the
worker and the firm in the same proportion as the revenues.3 From the perspective of
optimal insurance, it is optimal to assign all returns to the firm, since the firm is able
to diversify the risk on that return on capital markets. Hence, the optimal contract al-
locates also the cost of investing in firm-specific human capital to the firm.4 The same
logic applies to forms of firm-specific capital other than human capital. Accordingly,
in the absence of restrictions on shifting the costs and benefits of specific capital to
the firm, assigning the firm-specific risk to the firm does not impede this investment.
To the extent that the return on firm-specific investments and the workers’ share
in these investments (e.g. search and other hiring costs, the workers’ effort in firm-
specific training) are not fully observable and thus difficult to contract on, workers
have to bear part of the cost themselves. In that case, the worker and the firm face a
classic trade-off between insurance and incentives, like in the principal-agent prob-
lem: Assigning a risky return to workers implies that workers face optimal incentives
for specific investments but are not optimally insured and face some firm-specific
risk. Firms may be able to soften the trade-off between insurance and incentives by
better measuring individual performance. One way to do this is to split works and
teams and rewarding employees on the basis of the relative performance of these
teams.
2.4 Aggregate risks
The final type of risk, aggregate risk, affects all firms in the same way. Hence, it
cannot be diversified; somebody has to bear it. A simple solution would be to let
everybody share in the aggregate risk in proportion to individual wealth. This would
imply that the wage rate of workers varies in the same way as the stock market index
does. In practice, however, capital takes a larger share of the risk than labor does,
especially in the short run. We return to this issue in the next section.
2.5 Conclusions
Let us summarize the discussion thus far. For individual-specific risk, we face a clas-
sical trade-off between insurance and incentives. Hence, it must be shared in some
3Hosios (1990) derived this condition in a search-matching context in which the specific investments were
search efforts of both parties. We take a broader interpretation of specific investments here.
4In fact, this conclusion is reminiscent of the old normative rule of Gary Becker in that the cost of general
human capital should be borne by the worker, while the cost of specific human capital should be borne by
the firm.
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way between the worker and the rest of society. Firm-specific risk should be assigned
fully to the holders of the firm’s equity, because they can diversify their portfolio of
equity holdings on the capital market. By implication, firms should pay the largest
possible share of firm-specific capital. Finally, aggregate risk cannot be diversified
and must therefore be shared in some way between all agents in the economy.
3 Blockades on the way to Utopia
Would a decentralized society end up with this efficient assignment of the various
components of risk to workers and shareholders? Or are there reasons to suspect that
some components end up in the wrong hands? We argue that the optimal contract
is hard to implement in practice because workers may not be able to commit to not
claiming part of the surplus.
To understand the problem, we should explore what it means for workers to share
in the firm-specific risk. In particular, it implies that workers enjoy part of the excess
profits if the firm performs better than expected. If, in contrast, shareholders would
bear all of the risk, workers would not get anything of the upside. In practice, how-
ever, this outcome is unlikely to materialize, regardless of what has been negotiated
in the ex ante contract. The de facto bargaining power of the incumbent workforce is
such that they can capture part of the larger profits. To prevent the claim of current
workers on the surplus, the firm could use the threat of hiring replacements for the
incumbents. This threat, however, is hardly credible since the incumbents have to co-
operate in teaching the replacements the intricacies of the firm’s production process
(see Lindbeck and Snower 1990). Obviously, both problems are related: To the extent
that the workers cannot commit to exploit their bargaining power in the future, it is
optimal to assign a greater share of the cost of firm-specific investments to workers
today, as required by the Hosios condition.
One might think that this commitment problem also has a downside: If the firm
faces losses, it can use its bargaining power to impose some of these losses on work-
ers by threatening them with lay-offs in case they do not agree. In Utopia, however,
this strategy of the firm will not work, since firms bear the full cost of the specific
investment and should therefore get the full profit. If the firm would reduce wages
following an adverse shock, its workers would quit and take a job in another firm.
Hence, in Utopia, the relationship between the worker and the firm is asymmetric:
The worker can claim a higher wage in case of excess profits, but the firm cannot
shift part of the excess losses to its workers since they will simply execute their op-
tion to quit. This asymmetry is the logical consequence of assigning all firm-specific
investments to the firm. It is at the heart of the stability problem of Utopia: Incumbent
workers can only gain and the firm can only lose from renegotiating the contract.
The Utopian outcome seems to contradict the interest of workers. Even though the
firm-specific risk is a risky return, it is a positive return. Not sharing in that return
thus seems just another way of relinquishing part of the remuneration. Although this
may indeed be true ex post (after a worker has been employed by the firm), it is not
true ex ante (before being hired). Firms invest in new jobs to maximize profits. The
expected return on the investment in the marginal job must be sufficient to offset the
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costs of the investment. If workers are expected to capture part of the profits in good
states, the expected return on the investment will be lower so that fewer jobs will be
created. Since firms create fewer jobs, the demand for labor will be lower, as will be
starting wages. This adverse effect on starting wages more than offsets the expected
positive effect on wages of capturing part of the profits. In a global capital market
where the supply of capital is almost infinitely elastic, this effect is even stronger.
3.1 Insider power and the return to seniority
Most analyses of insider–outsider problems distinguish only between employed in-
siders and unemployed outsiders. However, in practice, insider power varies signifi-
cantly not only between workers and the unemployed, but also between workers with
various degrees of seniority. In particular, in an insider–outsider society, senior work-
ers obtain a far greater share in the firm’s rents than do workers who have recently
been hired. Kuhn (1988), Kuhn and Robert (1989) and Buhai et al. (2007) devel-
oped a model that allows a better understanding of how incumbents can exploit their
bargaining power to the detriment of new hires.
Suppose that a monopolistic firm faces a downward sloping product demand that
evolves over time according to a random walk. Consider the case where the firm pays
the full cost of firm-specific capital. It hires additional workers only when today’s
marginal revenue of an additional worker is strictly above the market wage. The sur-
plus of marginal revenue above the market wage serves as a compensation for the
cost of investing in specific capital. Suppose that a firm has just hired a new worker
and paid the specific investment cost for that worker. In that case, a small downward
shock in demand does not affect employment because the firm would then lose the
specific investment in the worker that it had just made. Only if product market condi-
tions depress demand substantially below the level at which it hired the new worker,
does the firm start to fire workers.5
The surplus of marginal revenue above wage costs implies that the firm captures
quasi rents, which provide compensation for the cost of the investment in firm-
specific capital. The firm hopes for a future rise in demand, so that the marginal
worker today will become an infra-marginal worker with higher quasi rents tomor-
row. In that case, the firm realizes the upside of the return on its investment. However,
the firm runs the risk of getting the downside, if demand falls instead of rises. Hence,
as in Utopia, the firm bears the risk on the specific investment. In general, the firm
captures higher quasi rents for infra-marginal workers. These higher rents are the up-
side on previous investments in specific capital; demand must have been lower when
these infra-marginal workers were hired because more workers were hired from that
moment on.
A simple way for workers to expropriate part of these quasi rents is to impose
a LIFO (Last-In-First-Out) rule on the firm, requiring the firm to fire workers with
lower seniority (= lower tenure) first before it is allowed to fire more senior workers,
and to require the firm to pay higher wages to more senior workers. This seniority
5In this discussion, we leave aside the option value of hiring and firing; see Buhai et al. (2007) for a
discussion.
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wage profile shares the quasi rents between the worker and the firm, more senior
workers getting a larger share of rents in the form of a seniority premium in their
wage than junior workers. Firms cannot evade paying these rents by laying off expen-
sive senior workers, since the LIFO rule obliges them to fire the cheap low seniority
workers first. Hence, the firm obtains lower compensation for its investments in firm-
specific capital. The firm responds to this fall in the return by postponing hiring new
workers. It will only hire additional workers if the surplus of marginal revenue is such
that even though part of the (quasi) rents goes to the workers, they can recoup the cost
of specific investment from their share in the rents. This reduces employment at the
firm.
Once hired, workers are less likely to be fired in this case. The reason is that there
is a large initial surplus, which is unlikely to evaporate by random shocks to product
demand. Hence, seniority premiums raise the average job tenure of a worker and
workers are less easily relocated to more productive job opportunities. To the extent
that the worker and the firm can offset this excess bargaining power by shifting part
of the cost of firm-specific investment to the worker, this problem can be undone.
However, then workers bear part of the firm-specific risk, which is at variance with
optimal risk sharing. In particular, the firm should assume all firm-specific risk, since
its shareholders are best able to diversify this risk on capital markets.
The strong position of senior workers in a world with seniority profiles generates
resource transfer from junior workers towards these senior workers. In other words,
it involves implicit pay-as-you-go transfers from one group of workers to another.
Accordingly, the key social conflict in a modern economy is not between labor and
capital, but between incumbent workers, who capture part of the surplus, and new en-
trants on the labor market, who rely on investments by capital in new jobs to become
employed.
3.2 Aggregate risks
What about aggregate risk? There is an extensive literature on the rigidity of wages
with respect to aggregate shocks (see e.g. Layard et al. 1991). Wages adjust to aggre-
gate shocks only after a lag, implying that capital bears most of the short-run impact
of aggregate shocks. Hence, workers are well insured against these shocks in the short
run. Whereas capital markets can diversify the firm-specific risk, they cannot diver-
sify aggregate risk because these risks affect all parties in the same way. However,
this excess short-run non-diversifiable risk imposed on capital is not the main prob-
lem. More problematic is rigidity of relative wages, which limits the opportunities for
differentiation of wages between new hires and incumbent workers. If relative wages
would be flexible, the wages for new hires would adjust so as to generate new jobs
for this group. Wage rigidity prevents this from happening.
4 Utopia versus the “real world”: the United States, Denmark and Portugal
We have identified some blockades on the way to the Utopia in which capital pays
the full cost of firm-specific capital, receives its full surplus and bears all of the firm-
specific risk. This section explores how actual economies behave in this respect. Do
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Table 1 Returns to tenure in
various countries
Sources:
aTeulings and Hartog (1998)
bBuhai et al. (2007); all
coefficients are based on simple
OLS regression, not using
corrections for selectivity
Country % higher wage compared to a new hire after
4 years of tenure 8 years of tenure
United Statesa 12% 20%
Denmarkb 2% 3%
Portugalb 6% 10%
workers indeed capture part of the excess profits, and if so, how do they do that? We
explore these questions by comparing the labor-market outcomes in three countries:
the United States, Denmark and Portugal. These countries are prototypical in the
sense that Portugal features high firing costs, which strengthens the ex-post bargain-
ing power of workers. Denmark and the U.S. lack these costs. Denmark differs from
the U.S. in that it exhibits more central wage bargaining. We selected Denmark and
Portugal also because we had access to matched worker-firm data for these countries.
A simple and crude way to explore how different countries perform in this respect
is to estimate tenure profiles in wages: How much does your wage go up if you have a
longer tenure (keeping other things equal)? Table 1 provides an overview of the wage
returns to tenure for our three prototypical countries. Tenure profiles turn out to be
much steeper in Portugal and, especially, the United States, compared to Denmark.
However, this evidence on the returns to tenure remains indicative at best. The models
in Kuhn (1988) and Kuhn and Robert (1989) imply that wages go up with tenure
(because the only way to obtain seniority is to stay at the same employer), but a higher
tenure does not lead automatically to seniority. It depends also on how many more
senior workers retire and on how many new workers are hired—that is, whether or not
your firm grows. Moreover, many alternative theories predict a positive relationship
between wages and tenure, so that we would like to have more conclusive evidence.
Fortunately, we can put these ideas to a more stringent test when we have data on
seniority of the worker. Wages vary not so much with the tenure of the worker, as they
do with the seniority of the worker—that is, her tenure relative to the tenure of other
workers in the firm. Buhai et al. (2007) tested this idea for Denmark and Portugal.6
When no worker quits and the firm’s employment is increased by 10% (meaning
that your seniority goes up), then your wage increases by at least7 0.1% in Denmark
and 0.2% in Portugal. For higher educated workers, these numbers are substantially
higher. Regrettably, we do not have data on the United States for this issue. However,
there is plenty of other evidence to suggest that wages include a larger share of firm-
specific (quasi) rents in countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom
and Portugal than in Scandinavian countries and countries such as the Netherlands
(see Teulings and Hartog 1998 for an overview). First, wage differentials between
industries for workers with equal human capital are much larger for the first group of
countries than for the second, and these industry differentials are strongly correlated
6All results are highly significant. We refer to the original paper for t -statistics and details of the estimation
procedure. The authors argue extensively why these results cannot be explained by selectivity problems of
the type that have plagued the literature on the estimation of the return to tenure.
7Measurement error biases these estimates downward.
Rhineland exit? 719
Table 2 Tenure distribution in
various countries, 2006
Sources:
aBureau of Labour Statistics
bOECD
Tenure in years 0–1 1–3 3–5 5–10 10 or more
United Statesa 24 12 17 21 26
Denmarkb 24 15 13 19 29
Portugalb 12 11 11 22 44
to the (quasi) rents in that industry, due to either its capital intensity, or to its market
power. Likewise, fluctuations in the output prices exert a much larger effect on wages
in the first group than in the second. Furthermore, an extensive literature explores the
reasons why large firms pay higher wages than small firms do. At least part of this
firm-size wage premium seems to be due to (quasi) rents. Again, the firm-size wage
effect is larger in the first group of countries than in the second. All of this evidence
corroborates our claim that there are substantial differences in the share of rents in
wages across countries, with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Portugal
having a large share.
The model laid out in the previous sections implies that a higher seniority profile
that is not offset by a shift of the cost of firm-specific investment from the firm to the
worker yields a higher average job tenure. As shown in Table 2, the fraction of short
tenures is rather high in the United States and Denmark, and it is low in Portugal.
Hence, the difference in the tenure distribution between the three countries suggests
that Denmark and the United States are closer to satisfying the Hosios condition than
Portugal is. Apparently, firms in the United States are able to offset the large returns
to tenure by shifting back part of the cost of firm-specific investments to workers,
while firms in Portugal have not been able to do so.
This empirical evidence suggests two things. First, Utopia is hard to reach. In all
countries, workers assume some share of the firm-specific risk.8 Second, there are
substantial differences in how far various countries are away from Utopia.
5 The role of politics: coordinated wage setting and employment protection
What causes the substantial institutional differences between countries that were doc-
umented in the previous section? Almost by necessity, they must be related to some
form of collective action—so that it is natural to wonder about the role of politics.
The outcome of bargaining processes is highly unpredictable. Small details of the
bargaining process, such as who is the first to make an offer, can have a large impact
on the final outcome. The evidence in Teulings and Hartog (1998) suggests that col-
lective wage bargaining reduces the impact of firm-specific risk on wages. Collective
wage contracts do not specify the wage rate for each individual worker, but they do
provide a norm for wage negotiations at the individual level. To the extent that this
norm is common to all firms, it restricts the impact of firm-specific factors. In this
way, coordination and collective action can help to move us closer to Utopia.
8With non-contractible firm-specific investments, workers must bear some firm-specific risks. The tenure
profiles can then be seen as a compensation for the firm-specific risks.
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Most collective action requires some form of political support, but political in-
tervention can also easily bring us further off track. The reason for this involves the
hold-up problem and the limited capacity of politicians to commit to future policies.
The ability to commit to future policies is a crucial condition for resolving hold-up
problems. In particular, workers have to be forward-looking and aware of the gains
of keeping their promises today in terms of better future employment prospects for
themselves and for future generations. Almost by definition, politicians exhibit only
a short time horizon. An election is to a politician what market competition is to an
entrepreneur: it counteracts abuse of power—monopoly power for the entrepreneur
and political power for the politician. At the same time, however, regular elections
undermine the ability of politicians to commit to policies that yield long-term gains.
If voters were forward-looking and well informed about the future consequences of
current actions, they would be more inclined to accept short-run losses in favor of the
long-term benefits of abundant job creation. However, even then, children and future
generations may not vote. Hence, politicians still face a strong incentive to promote
policies that yield only short-run gains, and to ignore the long-run costs for future
generations who are not included in today’s electorate. If politicians support the claim
of incumbent workers on the excess profits of the firm, then incumbent workers will
see their pay go up, while the costs of reduced future employment prospects and
lower wages for marginal workers hired tomorrow are ignored. Whereas politics can
play useful role in coordinating the action to bring us closer to Utopia, the incentives
of politicians are such that their first temptation is to carry us further away.
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) is a perfect example of policy that
caters to this temptation. It protects insiders, while it does little to help outsiders to
find a job. In terms of the model laid out in Sect. 3, the effect of EPL can be undone
by shifting part of the cost of firm-specific investment from the firm to the worker.
Then, EPL is a form of ex post compensation by the firm of the cost of investment
borne by the worker at the start of the employment relation. From this perspective,
the critical question is whether the amount of EPL does not stretch too far the ability
of shifting the cost of investment from the firm to the worker, and does not imply
that the worker bears an excessive amount of firm-specific risk. Many countries have
introduced some form of EPL. The form and degree of EPL differs between coun-
tries and over time. Lay-offs may require costly legal procedures or advance-notice
periods; sometimes, laid-off workers are entitled to financial compensation, which
usually varies according to age and tenure. Of the three prototypical countries, Den-
mark and the United States feature almost no EPL, while Portugal has quite a lot (see
Deelen et al. 2006 for an overview).
Although we were quick to claim that EPL is merely an instrument in the hands
of politicians to transfer surplus from outsiders to insiders (just as the introduction of
seniority profiles in wages), we must also ask whether EPL can play a role in insuring
firm-specific risks. In Utopia, the answer to this question is negative. Workers are paid
the market wage and firms bear all the risks on firm-specific investments. Hence,
losing your job is not much of a loss, since you will easily find another job at the
same market wage. Accordingly, EPL is not needed in our Utopia. This is, in fact,
close to the situation in Denmark.
We now turn to Portugal, which exhibits a steep seniority profile, with a 0.2%
wage increase for every 10% increase in seniority. A senior worker thus has a lot
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to lose if she would be laid off. Hence, from the perspective of the insurance of ex-
pected life-time labor income, EPL as financial compensation for being laid off seems
a logical policy instrument indeed. Usually, this financial compensation is related
to the last-earned wage of the worker. This system reduces downward flexibility in
wages because the worker gives up part of her EPL entitlement if she accepts a wage
cut. Moreover, EPL strengthens the bargaining position of workers; if the bargaining
process breaks down and the worker is laid off, she can collect EPL at the expense of
the firm. This raises the wages of incumbent workers. The only way to counteract the
upward pressure on wages is a high unemployment rate exerting downward pressure
on wages (see Blanchard and Portugal 2001). Indeed, those who are unemployed are
likely to remain so for a long period of time in view of slow job creation. Hence, EPL
may raise in an indirect way individual-specific risks facing younger generations.
The United States is a remarkable case. It features a steep tenure profile, but has
almost no EPL. Tenure profiles expose workers to more firm-specific risks: When
they are laid off because their firm is bankrupt, they usually do not receive much
financial compensation. Senior workers who are laid off lose a lot of their lifetime
income. Topel and Ward (1992) shows that more senior workers lose on average 25%
of their pre-displacement earnings in the first couple of years after displacement. The
explanation for this paradox of low EPL going hand-in-hand with steep tenure profiles
is likely to be the strong countervailing power in the American political system (see
Persson et al. 2000). This greatly restrains the ability of politicians both to impose
EPL and to facilitate central coordination in wage bargaining, which protects workers
against taking firm-specific risks.
The great accomplishment of Denmark is to have been able to sail between Scylla
and Charybdis. On the one hand, it has generated enough collective action for set-
ting up institutions providing collective norms for wage bargaining such that workers
do not capture much of firm’s excess profits. On the other hand, it has succeeded in
restraining politicians from introducing EPL. This outcome yields a low unemploy-
ment rate and flat seniority profiles in wages, which takes away a major argument for
introducing EPL in the first place. In other words, strong collective norms eliminate
the temptation to introduce EPL.
EPL thus gives rise to a paradox. EPL is meant to act as social insurance for in-
come loss and possible psychological losses related to job loss. At the same time,
however, it generates its demand by providing a mechanism that raises the demand
for insurance by pushing up the return to seniority. The net effect is an increase in un-
certainty in that workers bear more firm-specific risk via their return to seniority and,
when they get unemployed, also more individual-specific risk, since the lower rate of
job creation reduces their chances to find a new job. Those who manage to rise in the
seniority hierarchy do well. Those who do not, in contrast, end up bumping back and
forth between unemployment and the lower strata of the seniority hierarchies, and
with some bad luck, never get out of bad jobs. Indeed, Clark and Postel-Vinay (2006)
show that workers feel most insecure about their job in countries with the most exten-
sive EPL. The paradox of EPL is that it creates exactly the sentiment of job insecurity
that it is meant to cure. Indeed, the ease with which it is possible to find a new job,
rather than the difficulty of being laid off from the current job, appears to determine
the sentiment of security. To illustrate, the flexible Danish system, in which you are
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easily laid off but where finding a new job is as easy, provides more security than the
Portuguese system, with steep seniority profiles and strong EPL.
6 Corporate governance legislation
The argument put forward in this paper suggests that firms should maximize long-run
shareholder value. However, the results discussed in Sect. 4 suggest that in economies
that embrace the principle of shareholder value most wholeheartedly this outcome is
not realized easily. Denmark is closer to the Utopian outcome than the United States.
Apparently, the legal framework for corporate governance is not the only thing that
matters. How can this paradox be explained?
The relationships between the firm’s management and its workers involve an in-
completely specified contract. What type of effort workers should deliver is hard to
determine ex ante, and if it could be determined, it would be hard to specify in a
legally enforceable contract. The incompleteness of this contract demands that the
management builds up a reputation of reliability vis a vis its workers. Only the man-
agement’s reputation can provide the workers a guarantee that management will stand
up to its promises. This is also one of the most important roles of the firm: It is a nexus
of implicit contracts held together by the reputation of management. Reputations re-
quire long time horizons. In many cases, a takeover is just a means to get rid of some
of the firms’ obligations vis a vis its workforce. The replacement of management im-
plies that the commitments and promises of the previous management are eliminated,
giving a new management the opportunity to conclude new deals. Shleifer and Sum-
mers (1988) claim that a large share of the gain in stock market value when a firm
is taken over are (quasi) rents extracted from other stakeholders. A typical example
is the airline industry, where a takeover was a means for the airline to get rid of in-
completely specified defined-benefit pension obligation towards the airline’s retired
workers. Similarly, takeovers are often used to reduce wages.
The takeover mechanism thus makes it more difficult for management to commit
to implicit contracts with workers and other stakeholders. In particular, the threat of
a future takeover, followed by a replacement of the current management, undermines
the management’s ability to come to an agreement on an implicit contract with its
workers because workers realize that management can be replaced at any future date
by the shareholders. This mechanism might explain why there is no unequivocal road
from legal structure of corporate governance to the ability of management to come
to an agreement with its workers to leave most of the (quasi) rent in the hands of
shareholders and to pay most investments in firm-specific capital. Without such a
commitment mechanism, the various stakeholders may pursue short-run goals at the
cost of pursuing the joint interest of maximizing the long-run value of the firm.
Another related issue that often comes up in this context is a possible conflict
between the long-run interest of the firm and the short-run orientation of shareholders.
In principle, holding equity in a firm gives an investor an interest in the long-run
prospects of the firm, since the value of that equity is equal to the net discounted
future cash flow of the firm. However, shareholders have less information than the
firm’s management. If this management lacks confidence in the eyes of shareholders,
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they do not have the credibility to pursue long-run investment projects that are hard
to verify by shareholders. Hence, management lacking shareholder-confidence may
be tempted to postpone long-run investments with hard-to-verify returns and instead
pursue policies that generate immediate cash flows that are easily verifiable.
There are two solutions to this problem. First, the management should protect its
reputation by keeping long-run promises to shareholders. Second, firms may want
to attract shareholders that hold a substantial stake in the firm’s equity for a longer
period of time, so that these shareholders can invest in the collection of information
about long-run investment projects. In view of their substantial capital, institutional
investors like pension funds are obvious candidates for playing this role.
Another problem with the shareholder model is that shareholders’ limited liability
gives them an incentive for excessive risk taking. They enjoy the upside, but their
limited liability protects shareholders against large downsides. This downside risk is
shifted to the other stakeholders, in general, and to debt holders, in particular. Writing
more complete debt contracts is the remedy for this problem
Since Thatcher, the United Kingdom has legislation that gives shareholders the
strongest formal power, including the right to appoint board members, and also the
right to fire them. In the United States, shareholders have fewer means to fire board
members, but the law provides the board with a single and transparent goal: maxi-
mize shareholder value. Shareholders can go to court and put liability claims against
managers who fail to do so. This might be an effective combination: The single goal
makes managers accountable, while the protection of management against interven-
tion by shareholders provides them the credibility to negotiate implicit contracts with
the workers.
The Rhineland principle of equal treatment of the interests of all stakeholders
strengthens the moral legitimacy of the claims of workers on the surplus of a firm.
According to Bertrand and Mullanaithan (2003), workers enjoy a greater share in the
surplus, superfluous workers are less easily laid off, and new activities are set up at
a lower rate than in U.S. Hence, the Rhineland idea of firewalls against takeovers
gives workers a greater share in any firm-specific surplus.9 Legislation based on the
stakeholder model thus gives moral legitimacy to the claim of insiders on the surplus
of the firm, thereby exposing workers to firm-specific risks and worsening the hold-up
problem.
Although giving up the moral claim on the surplus of the firm is in the long-run in-
terests of workers, it gives rise to difficult transitional issues. Currently older workers
with high seniority benefit from the Rhineland system. They are thus understandably
concerned about a takeover by hedge funds and private equity because they are likely
to lose a claim on the surplus if such a takeover would occur. Indeed, the Rhineland
principles no longer offer much protection to workers. The incomplete contract gives
rise only to ambiguous property rights. In this way, workers are saddled with even
more firm-specific risk. Hence, it is better to move to a model in which workers do
9In addition, one might wonder why stakeholders who are protected by separate legislation (such as EPL
for workers, and Anti-trust and Competition Legislation for customers and suppliers against the abuse of
market power) should receive additional protection during takeovers. These laws provide a more complete
formulation of stakeholder rights than CGL does.
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not derive their security from the financial stability of their firm but from the value
of their own human capital. In such a world, free international trade in corporate
control is more legitimate. Countries that provide this new form of security enjoy a
competitive advantage on the world capital market.
One way to address the transitional issue would be to replace the implicit transfers
from junior outsiders to more senior insiders by temporary, explicit transfers to the
latter group. For example, the reduction of the return to seniority and EPL could go
hand-in-hand with temporary in-work tax benefits for elderly. These in-work benefits
should be gradually reduced, as younger cohorts anticipate a flatter seniority profile
and save more. The flattening of seniority wage profiles is a cultural change involving
collective norms. These processes are painful and time-consuming. In the meantime,
the political rhetoric and ideology should not give legitimacy to new claims of work-
ers on the surplus of the firm.
7 Conclusions
In our Utopia, workers would not bear any firm-specific risk, since this risk can be
well diversified on capital markets. Diversification of this risk on the capital market
is an efficient form of social insurance. With shareholders bearing firm-specific risks,
these shareholders are the residual claimants on the full surplus of the firm; the ulti-
mate goal of the firm is thus to maximize shareholder value. The other stakeholders
collect only their outside option and are thus not exposed to firm-specific risks. The
principle of maximization of shareholder value being the ultimate goal of the firm is
at odds with the Rhineland philosophy of a balanced treatment of the interests of all
stakeholders.
We have uncovered three paradoxes. First, workers’ relinquishing claims on the
surplus of the firm does not conflict with the interests of workers as a whole. This is
because capturing part of the firm’s surplus raises the cost of capital for investment
in new jobs. For workers as a group, the adverse effect of less job creation on wages
more than outweighs the positive effect of capturing part of the firm’s profits. Workers
thus face a commitment problem. When entering the labor market as an outsider, they
would like to promise that they are giving up future claims on the firm’s surplus. After
having secured their position as a senior insider, however, their interest is to claim the
surplus, after all. The interests of insiders thus diverge from those of outsiders. In
open economies facing an elastic supply of capital, the associated conflict between
outsiders and insiders is more serious than the traditional conflict between capital and
labor.
The second paradox is that Anglo-Saxon countries like the United States are not
the closest approximation of the Utopian world of complete diversification of firm-
specific risk in the capital market. A wealth of empirical evidence suggests that de-
centralized bargaining over wages allows workers to capture a substantial part of the
firm’s surplus. Of the three countries discussed in this paper, Denmark appears to
be much closer to Utopia than is the United States. Some shared norms on what is
proper compensation and some coordination in wage bargaining help to sustain the
Utopian outcome and appear to be more important than corporate governance legis-
lation. Since institutions such as coordination in wage bargaining and social norms
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play an important role in getting to Utopia, collective action has an important role to
play. By actively supporting the rights of outsiders and by denying insiders a share in
the firm’s surplus, a country can get close to Utopia, as Denmark shows. Politicians,
however, face the temptation to please voters and incumbent workers with short-run
gains at the expense of the surplus of future workers. Hence, while politics has an
important role to play, it can be a mixed blessing.
The third paradox is that, while globalization of capital markets has greatly in-
creased the scope for diversification of firm-specific risk, it has also eroded the incen-
tives for politicians to play their role properly. Globalization has reduced the political
support for protecting the claims of shareholders on the firm’s surplus, since the ma-
jority of shareholders are foreigners. Hence, politicians may find it more difficult to
convince voters that the claims of shareholders should be protected. However, the
increased mobility of capital may help in this respect—in that high wage claims may
convince corporations at an earlier stage to move their factories abroad. In this way,
the short-run labor-demand elasticity may get closer to the corresponding long-run
elasticity. In any case, a more equal distribution of capital income (through e.g. pen-
sion saving of the middle class) may help to legitimize wage restraint of incumbent
workers. The transition to Utopia is fraught with difficulties. Indeed, the problem is
analogous to the transition from a pay-as-you-go to a funded pension system: one
generation has to pay twice. While society reaps long-run gains in efficiency, in the
short run a generation of insiders will have to give up their rights without benefiting
from increased job creation and higher starting wages: Being insiders, they already
have a job while having paid their dues in the past in terms of a low starting wage.
Whereas the claims of older workers on the surplus of a firm may thus have some
legitimacy, younger cohorts should be denied such moral claims. These problems
require extreme political skill to solve.
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